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Questions Presented
I. Whether the ESA applies to the CTCR's exercise of its treaty-reserved
fishing rights when there is no clear evidence on the face of the Act, in the
Act's legislative history, or in the surrounding circumstances that indicates
Congress intended for the ESA to abrogate Indian treaty rights.
II. Whether the NMFS should be required to first impose all reasonable
restrictions on non-Indian activities before enforcing the ESA against the
CTCR when the NMFS plan currently applies restrictions that are not
essential to the conservation of salmon and when the conservation purpose
of the plan can be achieved by reasonable regulation of non-Indian
activities.
I1. Whether the CTCR has a right to co-manage NFS lands in order to
protect its members' ability to exercise their treaty fishing rights in light of
the federal government's trust responsibility and the well-established judicial
respect for Indian sovereignty.
IV. Whether the USFS has an obligation to at least manage fisheries on
NFS lands to the level necessary to provide the CTCR members with
sufficient salmon harvest so that they can maintain a moderate standard of
living when the CTCR treaty guarantees the CTCR a moderate standard of
living and the federal government's deep-rooted trust responsibility
implicitly requires it.
Opinion Below
The opinion of the United States District Court for the District of Oregon
has not been officially reported. The opinion is set out at pages 1-18 in the
Transcript of Record.

*J.D., 2001, University of Cincinnati College of Law. Attorney, WeItman, Weinberg & Reis
Co., L.P.A., Cincinnati, Ohio.
**J.D., 2002, University of Cincinnati College of Law.
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Statement of the Case
A. Statement of the Facts
In 1855, the Confederated Tribes of the Columbia River (hereinafter
"CTCR") negotiated a treaty ("CTCR treaty" or "treaty") with Isaac Stevens
("Stevens") and Joel Palmer ("Palmer"), governors respectively of the
Washington and Oregon Territories, peacefully agreeing to cede most of its
member tribes' lands to the United States government in exchange for the
solemn promise that its members' fishing rights would be protected in
perpetuity. (R. at 6.) The salmon harvest and consumption was of great
economic, cultural, and religious importance to the CTCR. Id.
The record of the treaty negotiations reflects the CTCR's insistence on
the maintenance of tribal fishing rights both on and off its member tribes'
reservations. Id. As a result of these negotiations, the CTCR treaty, like
most other treaties negotiated by Stevens and Palmer, contained provisions
promising the CTCR the exclusive right to fish on the lands it retained, as
well as "the right of taking fish at all usual and accustomed stations ... in
common with all citizens" off its members' reservations. Id. The latter
language provided the crucial guarantee that the CTCR members would be
able to harvest an adequate food supply, as the relatively small tract of land
the treaty reserved did not contain enough fishing sites to sustain the
CTCR's traditional way of life. Id.
Pursuant to the treaty, CTCR members harvest salmon from sites along
the Columbia River and its tributaries. (R. at 8.) The CTCR promotes selfregulation with regard to fishing by maintaining a Department of Natural
Resources that monitors the salmon resource and regulates tribal members'
fishing rights. Id.
Unfortunately, the salmon harvest has declined in recent years and the
CTCR has been forced to curtail its fishery. Id. This decline is due in large
part to the industry and agriculture that has sprung up near the Columbia
River. Id. In late 1993, in response to concerns about habitat for certain
Columbia River salmon stocks, the United States Forest Service ("USFS")
began working on a Riparian Management Strategy for National Forest
System Lands in the Columbia River Basin. (R. at 10.)
The USFS Strategy called for 50-foot buffers around riparian areas in
which no logging or grazing would be permitted, and additional 50-foot
buffers in which only selective logging and grazing would be allowed. (R.
at 11-12.) The CTCR complained that the USFS Strategy was not sufficient
to provide enough protection to salmon rearing and spawning habitat to
ensure that there would be sufficient fish to provide the CTCR members
with their treaty-protected "moderate standard of living." (R. at 12.)
The CTCR Department of Natural Resources subsequently developed its
own Riparian Management Strategy. (R. at 11.) This strategy called for
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200-foot "no activity" buffers around all known salmon spawning and
rearing streams, and 100-foot "no activity" buffers around all other riparian
areas. Id. The CTCR Strategy identified 1000 stream miles of salmon
spawning and rearing riparian areas requiring the 200-foot buffer. Id. In
spite of this more conservation-conscious alternative, the USFS issued a
Record of Decision adopting its own Riparian Strategy on November 10,
1999. (R. at 11.)
The salmon death tolls since have risen so high that some species of
salmon are now listed as "threatened" or "endangered" under the
Endangered Species Act ("ESA"), 16 U.S.C. § 1531 et seq. (R. at 2.) In
response, the National Marine Fisheries Service ("NMFS") issued an ESAmandated recovery plan ("NMFS Plan" or "Plan") for the mainstem
Columbia River and its tributaries. Id. The NMFS Plan, issued January 1,
2000, sets out resource management criteria that NMFS scientists and policy
makers have determined are necessary for the preservation of these species
from extinction. Id. While the NMFS consulted with various parties
involved in order to develop the Plan, including the CTCR, the CTCR and
the other fishing interests ultimately did not agree with the management
recommendations. (R. at 3.)
The NMFS Plan adopts the USFS Riparian Strategy and further
recommends restrictions or modifications to a broad spectrum of industries:
hydropower activities, farming, timber harvest, livestock grazing, home
building, and other industrial development. (R. at 14.) While the Plan's
economic analysis indicates that compliance with the Plan would result in
a 10% to 35% reduction in profitability for each of these industries, job
losses would be minimal and most businesses would remain and show
growth within ten or twenty years. (R. at 15.)
The Plan's impact on the CTCR is another story. The Plan further
recommends a harsh, ten-year ban on all fishing in the Columbia and its
tributaries. Id. Moreover, because of the Plan's minimal protections of
salmon spawning and rearing habitat, the levels of harvest would be such
that each tribal fisherman would be permitted to harvest a maximum of only
ten pounds of fish per month after the expiration of the ten-year
moratorium, far below the 100 pounds per month that the members of the
CTCR need to harvest to attain a "moderate standard of living." (R. at 16.)
In short, the effect of the NMFS Plan on the CTCR would be devastating.
Id.
Quite significantly, the NMFS Plan did not recommend the removal of
four dams on the lower Snake River, which many environmentalists as well
as the CTCR had urged as necessary for preventing the extinction of Snake
River salmonids. (R. at 2, 15, n. 8.) The reasons listed in the Plan for this
omission were three-fold: 1) only Snake River fish show a benefit from dam
removal; 2) dam removal is expensive; and 3) there is scientific uncertainty
as to whether dam removal is necessary for the recovery of these species
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from the ESA listing. (R. at 15, n. 8.) While there is definitely some
scientific uncertainty as to whether removal of the Snake River dams would
be necessary for the recovery of the species to non-listed status, the
scientific evidence is overwhelming that dam removal is necessary to
provide a harvestable surplus that would permit the harvest of at least 100
pounds per month of fish per each tribal fisherman. (R. at 16.)
Because of the inadequacies of the USFS' Riparian Strategy and the
NMFS Plan with regard to its fishing rights, the CTCR conducted its own
analysis and developed its own basin-wide recovery plan. (R. at 15-16.)
This analysis and subsequent plan, based on NMFS' own data, indicate that
with more stringent requirements on each of the other affected industries,
some tribal fishing could occur in the short term without harming the
resource. (R. at 15.) In particular, the CTCR analysis and plan demonstrate
that the removal of the four Snake River dams and implementation of the
CTCR Riparian Strategy, which calls for larger buffers around salmon
spawning and rearing streams, would result in sufficient short and long-term
recovery of salmon resources to permit levels of harvest necessary to
provide tribal members with a moderate standard of living. (R. at 15-16.)
The NMFS reviewed the CTCR plan and rejected it as being too
burdensome to implement (R. at 4.) The NMFS also threatened that it
would undertake enforcement actions against the CTCR and any of its
members if tribal harvest was permitted to proceed. Id. The CTCR, openly
adamant that the NMFS Plan sacrificed tribal treaty-reserved rights to
benefit more powerful economic interests, instructed its enforcement officers
to accompany tribal fishermen and to take any means necessary to protect
the exercise of treaty-reserved rights. Id. After a few days of tense
standoffs at various docks around the Columbia River, the CTCR filed this
lawsuit. Id.
B. ProceduralHistory
The CTCR filed a lawsuit in the United States District Court for the
District of Oregon against the NMFS and the USFS, seeking to enjoin
federal enforcement of the ESA against CTCR members exercising their
treaty-reserved fishing rights, and additionally to require the USFS to
develop a "co-management" plan for the protection of critical spawning and
rearing habitat on National Forest System lands. (R. at 4.)
The Defendants filed a motion for summary judgment. (R. at 2.) The
parties stipulated to most of the facts, with the exception of the testimony
of two experts, whose testimony was presented via affidavits attached to the
CTCR's responsive pleading: Dr. Jack Karr ("Dr. Karr"), a fisheries scientist
with a Ph.D. in aquatic ecology and riparian habitat management; and Dr.
Ellen Meiler ("Dr. Meiler"), an economist with a Ph.D. in natural resource
and subsistence economics. Id. The Defendants did not contest the
assertions in those affidavits nor offer any contrary affidavits. Id.
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The District Court granted the Defendants' Motion for Summary
Judgment on all claims. (R. at 17-18.) In entering judgment in favor of the
USFS and the NMFS, the District Court found: (1) The ESA applies to the
CTCR's exercise of its treaty-reserved fishing rights; (2) The NMFS need
not first impose all necessary restrictions on non-Indian activities before
enforcing the ESA against the CTCR; (3) the USFS does not have an
obligation to manage fisheries habitat on National Forest System lands to
the level necessary to provide the CTCR members with sufficient fish so
that they can exercise their treaty fishing rights to maintain a moderate
standard of living; (4) the CTCR does not have a right to "co-manage"
National Forest System lands in order to protect its members' ability to
exercise their treaty-reserved fishing rights to maintain a moderate standard
of living. Id.
The CTCR filed an immediate appeal to the Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals. In a highly unusual move, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the District
Court decision without opinion, in order to facilitate an immediate appeal
to the United States Supreme Court. Id. The CTCR filed a notice of appeal
in the Supreme Court, and the Supreme Court granted certiorari. Id. The
CTCR now appeals the Order of the District Court in favor of the USFS
and the NMFS. id.
Summary of the Argument
This Court should reverse the Order of the District Court. This Court
should find that the ESA does not apply to the CTCR's treaty-reserved
fishing rights. If it finds that the ESA applies, however, this Court should
require the NMFS to initiate a conservation plan that first imposes all
reasonable restrictions on non-Indian activities. Moreover, this Court should
find that the CTCR has a right to co-manage National Forest System lands
in order to protect its members' ability to exercise their treaty fishing rights
to maintain a moderate standard of living. If this Court finds that the CTCR
has no such right, however, this Court should hold that the USFS at least
has an obligation to manage fisheries habitat on National Forest System
lands to the level necessary to provide the CTCR members with sufficient
fish so that they can exercise their treaty-reserved fishing rights to maintain
a moderate standard of living.
This Court should find that the ESA does not apply to the CTCR's treatyreserved fishing rights. Because the NMFS' ESA-mandated Plan completely
abrogates the CTCR's treaty rights, the Dion test should be applied to
determine whether Congress intended for similar treaty rights to be
abrogated by the ESA. Under the Dion test, the CTCR should retain its
treaty rights in full force because there is no clear evidence on the face of
the Act, in the Act's legislative history, or in the surrounding circumstances
that indicates Congress intended for the ESA to abrogate Indian treaty
rights.
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If this Court finds, however, that the ESA applies, the NMFS should be
required to initiate a plan that first imposes all reasonable restrictions on
non-Indian activities. The NMFS Plan currently applies restrictions to the
CTCR's treaty-reserved fishing rights that are not 'essential' to the
conservation of the salmon. Furthermore, the conservation purpose of the
Plan can be achieved by the reasonable regulation of non-Indian activities.
Such regulation is consistent with the ESA's goal of recovering the salmon
and with the government's deep-rooted trust responsibility to the Indians.
Moreover, this Court should find that the CTCR has a right to co-manage
National Forest System lands in order to protect its members' ability to
exercise their treaty-reserved fishing rights to maintain a moderate standard
of living. Because the Supreme Court has repeatedly held that an Indian
tribe under treaty should be treated as a sovereign nation and is one towards
which the United States owes a trust obligation, the CTCR must be granted
the right to participate in decision-making that significantly affects its lands
and treaty-reserved rights.
Even if this Court finds that the CTCR has no right of co-management,
this Court should hold that the USFS at least has an obligation to manage
fisheries habitat on National Forest System lands to the level necessary to
provide the CTCR members with sufficient fish so that they can exercise
their treaty-reserved fishing rights to maintain a moderate standard of living.
The NMFS Plan, which incorporates the USFS' Riparian Strategy,
completely abrogates the CTCR's treaty-reserved rights and would severely
diminish the CTCR's standard of living, causing a negative impact on tribal
health and welfare. With the signing of the 1855 treaty, the CTCR was
guaranteed at least a moderate standard of living, and in light of the
government's trust obligation and the well-established judicial respect for
Indian sovereignty, that standard of living must be upheld by any reasonable
means.
Argument
L The Lower Court Erred in Holding that the ESA Applies to the CTCR's
Exercise of its Treaty-Reserved Fishing Rights
An Indian treaty is "not a grant of rights to the Indians, but a grant of
rights from them - a reservation of those not granted." U.S. v. Winans,
198 U.S. 371, 381 (1905). Many years ago, the Indians of the Northwest,
through written treaties, peacefully gave up much of their land to the white
settlers in exchange for the solemn promise that their fishing rights would
be protected in perpetuity by the United States. After all, fish were as
important to the Indians as "the atmosphere they breathed." Id.
Over the years, this Court has interpreted these treaties very liberally,
clearly recognizing the "trust responsibility" the United States has with
regards to Indians. See, e.g., Washington v. Washington State Commercial
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PassengerFishing Vessel Ass'n, 443 U.S. 658 (1979). While this Court has
granted Congress the right to unilaterally abrogate Indian treaties, Lone Wolf
v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553, 566 (1903), courts should not construe statutes
as abrogating treaty rights in a "backhanded way," Menominee Tribe v.
United States, 391 U.S. 404, 412 (1968), and "the intention to abrogate or
modify a treaty is not to be lightly imputed to Congress." Id. (quoting
Pigeon River Co. v. Cox Co., 291 U.S. 138, 160 (1934)).
Acting congruously with the aforementioned principles, the Supreme
Court recently established, in United States v. Dion, 476 U.S. 734 (1986),
the "actual choice and consideration" test, discussed infra, as the proper
standard to be applied in instances where Congress' intent to abrogate treaty
rights has been called into question. 476 U.S. at 739-40. Under the standard
set forth in Dion, this Court should find that the ESA does not abrogate the
CTCR's treaty-reserved fishing rights.
A. The Dion Test Is the ProperStandard to Apply to a Question of
Treaty Abrogation.
Under the CTCR treaty, the CTCR are entitled to harvest enough fish to
sustain a "moderate [standard of] living." PassengerFishing Vessel, 443
U.S. at 686. The Meiler Affidavit concluded that in order to maintain a
"moderate standard of living," CTCR fishermen would have to harvest a
minimum of 100 pounds of fish per month. (R. at 13.) In spite of this, the
NMFS seeks to implement a plan that not only calls for a ten-year ban on
all treaty fishing (R. at 15), but one that permits each tribal fisherman a
harvest of only ten pounds of fish per month after the ten year moratorium.
(R. at 16.)
Because the CTCR would never again be able to maintain a moderate
standard of living under the ESA-mandated NMFS Plan, its treaty rights
would effectively be abrogated by the ESA. Therefore, the ESA should be
subjected to the Dion test in order to determine Whether if Congress, in
enacting the ESA, demonstrated sufficient intent to abrogate Indian treaty
rights.
In Dion, this Court was asked to determine whether the Bald Eagle
Protection Act (BEPA) and the ESA were treaty-abrogating acts of
Congress after an Indian was arrested and convicted of shooting four bald
eagles on the Yankton Sioux Reservation. 476 U.S. at 735-36. In deciding
that the Court of Appeals erred in recognizing Dion's treaty defense to his
BEPA and ESA prosecutions, id.at 746, the Court ruled that, to determine
congressional intent under an abrogation question, a court should look first
and foremost to the face of the statute, but it may also look to the statute's
legislative history and surrounding circumstances. Id. at 739. The Court
decisively set forth that although an express statement by Congress is
preferable for determining an intent to abrogate treaty rights, "[wlhat is
essential is clear evidence that Congress actually considered the conflict
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between its intendedaction on the one hand and Indian treaty rights on the
other, and chose to resolve that conflict by abrogating the treaty." Id. at
739-40 (emphasis added).
The Court decided that, based upon the express language of the statute
and the entire legislative history of the BEPA, Congress actually considered
the conflict between the BEPA and Indian treaty rights and decided to
abrogate the treaty rights. Id. at 743. The Court focused especially on a
1962 amendment that provided in part that the Secretary of the Interior may
exempt, by permit, takings of bald or golden eagles for the religious
purpose of Indian tribes. Id. at 741. The Court reasoned that this provision
likely was a reflection of an understanding that the statute otherwise bans
the taking of eagles by Indians. Id. at 743-44.
The treaty having been abrogated by the BEPA, the Court decided that
there was no reason to determine if the ESA abrogated the treaty. Id. at
745. However, the Court seemed to agree with Dion's assertion that the
ESA and its legislative history are ... "to a great extent silent regarding
Indian hunting rights." Id. The Court nevertheless concluded that "[e]ven
if Congress did not address Indian treaty rights in the Endangered Species
Act sufficiently expressly to effect a valid abrogation ...[Dion] can [still)
assert no treaty defense to a prosecution under that Act for a taking already
explicitly prohibited under the [Bald] Eagle Protection Act." Id. at 746.
While Dion set forth a test to determine congressional intent to abrogate
Indian treaties, it failed to address specifically whether Congress intended
for the ESA to abrogate Indian treaty rights. This question is now squarely
before the Court.
B. Under the Dion Test, the CTCR Should Retain Its Treaty Rights in
Full Force Because There Is No Clear Evidence on the Face of the Act,
in the Act's Legislative History, or in the Surrounding Circumstances
That Indicates Congress Intendedfor the ESA to Abrogate Indian Treaty
Rights.
As is stated above, this Court has never construed the ESA in the context
of abrogation of Indian treaty rights. Furthermore, no federal circuit court
of appeals to date has addressed the issue. While one federal district court
applied the Dion test and decided that the ESA abrogated a Seminole
Indian's treaty-reserved right to hunt and fish on his reservation, U.S. v.
Billie, 667 F. Supp. 1485 (S.D. Fla. 1987), many learned commentators
criticized this decision and concluded that other courts would likely find
that the ESA does not abrogate Indian treaty rights. See Sally J. Johnson,
Honoring Treaty Rights and Conserving EndangeredSpecies After United
States v. Dion, 13 Pub. Land L.Rev. 179 (1992); Robert Laurence, The
Abrogation of Indian Treaties By Federal Statutes Protective of the
Environment, 31 Nat. Resources J. 859 (1991); Robert J. Miller, Speaking
With Forked Tongues: Indian Treaties, Salmon, and the EndangeredSpecies
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Act, 70 Or. L. Rev. 543 (1991); but see Conrad A. Fjetland, The
EndangeredSpecies Act and Indian Treaty Rights: A Fresh Look, 13 Tul.
Envtl. L.J. 45 (1999) (agreeing with the Billie decision).
The Billie court's argument for congressional intent on the face of the
statute, likely to be reiterated by the Respondents, was as follows: "[The
ESA's] general comprehensiveness, its nonexclusion of Indians, and the
limited exceptions for certain Alaskan natives . . . demonstrates that
Congress considered Indian interests, balanced them against conservation
needs, and defined the extent to which Indians would be permitted to take
protected wildlife." 667 F. Supp. at 1490.
This argument falls well short of the mark under the Dion test for a
number of reasons. First, "general comprehensiveness" and the
"nonexclusion of Indians" is inconclusive under this standard. After all,
many federal statutes are comprehensive. Furthermore, any statute that
raises the issue of abrogation of treaty rights will logically not have an
exclusion for Indians. See Laurence at 879. Furthermore, the fact that a
statute allows for a limited exception for certain Alaskan natives is
irrelevant for purposes of treaty rights analysis because Native Alaskans do
not have treaty rights. U.S. v. Bresette, 761 F. Supp. 658, 663 (D.Minn.
1991). "To treat the consideration of indigenous Alaskans' rights as the
consideration of Native American treaty rights nationwide, for the simple
reason that both groups are regarded as Indians, is disingenuous." Id. Thus,
there is no "clear evidence" on the face of the ESA indicating that Congress
considered Indian treaty rights and chose to abrogate them.
The Billie court based part of its holding on the legislative history of two
companion bills before the 92nd Congress. 667 F. Supp. at 1490. Those
unpassed bills contained exemptions encompassing the taking of protected
species for Indian religious purposes pursuant to a treaty, executive order,
or statute. Id. However, during the discussion period, an official warned the
Committees that, without an express abrogation clause, Indian treaty rights
would survive. Id. at 1491.
As stated above, the bills never passed. Id. While the ESA was passed
by the 93rd Congress in 1973, it is undisputed that there is no mention of
the abovementioned exemptions or Indian treaties in the records of the 93rd
Congress. Id. Quite significantly, this Court has held that "mute
intermediate legislative maneuvers" are not reliable indicators of
congressional intent. Mead Corp. v. Tilley, 490 U.S. 714, 723 (1989). So
while some of the congressmen discussing the proposed legislation in the
93rd Congress were obviously carry-overs from the previous term, this does
not amount to clear evidence that the 93rd Congress considered the question
of Indian treaty abrogation when it enacted the ESA. If in fact they had
considered treaty rights and chosen to abrogate them, the carry-overs likely
would have heeded the warning of the official before the previous Congress,
supra,and installed an express statement in the ESA regarding Indian treaty
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abrogation. Instead, the legislative history of the ESA is completely devoid
of any mention of Indian treaty rights.
The Billie case was wrongly decided. See, e.g., Johnson, supra. Under
the Dion "actual consideration and choice" test, the ESA should be found
to abrogate Indian treaty rights only if there is clear evidence of such
consideration and choice. However, the face of the ESA, its legislative
history, and the surrounding circumstances reflect nothing that demonstrates
clear evidence that Congress actually considered the conflict between the
ESA and Indian treaty rights and chose to resolve that conflict by
abrogating treaty rights. In light of the above, this Court should refuse to
apply the ESA to the CTCR's treaty-reserved fishing rights without more
explicit guidance from Congress.
II. The Lower Court Erred in Holding that the NMFS Need Not First
Impose all Necessary Restrictions on non-Indian Activities Before
Enforcing the ESA Against the CTCR.
Even if this Court decides under the Dion test that the ESA applies to the
CTCR's treaty-reserved fishing rights, the Court should nevertheless require
the NMFS to adopt a plan that, while promoting the conservation of the
salmon at issue, is the least restrictive alternative with regards to Indian
treaty rights. To do this, the Court should require that the plan first seek to
achieve the conservation of the salmon through the reasonable restriction of
non-Indian interests. Such a plan would be consistent with the conservation
purpose of the ESA and with the federal government's long-recognized trust
responsibility to the Indians.
A. The NMFS Plan Currently Applies Restrictions to the CTCR's TreatyReserved Fishing Rights That Are Not 'Essential' to the Conservation of
the Salmon.
In Puyallup Tribe v. Department of Game of Washington, 391 U.S. 392
(1968), this Court held that a State could regulate various aspects of offreservation fishing "in the interest of conservation, provided the regulation
meets appropriate standards and does not discriminate against the Indians."
391 U.S. at 398; See United States v. Fryberg, 622 F.2d 1010 (9th Cir.
1980) (recognizing a Puyallup-like "conservation standard" in the context
of the Bald Eagle Protection Act). The 'appropriate standards' requirement
means that the State must demonstrate that 1) its regulation is a reasonable
and necessary conservation measure, and that 2) its application to the
Indians is necessary in the interest of conservation. Antoine v. Washington,
420 U.S. 194, 207 (1975).
In the context of the first of the Antoine sub-criteria, 'reasonable' requires
that a specifically identified conservation measure is appropriate to its
purpose; and 'necessary' means that such purpose, in addition to being
reasonable, must be 'essential' to conservation. UnitedStates v. Washington,
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384 F. Supp. 312, 342 (W.D. Wash. 1974) (emphasis added). In this case,
the CTCR has already proven that the restrictions imposed on its treaty
rights are not 'necessary' in that they are not 'essential' to the conservation
of the salmon. The CTCR has shown, through its analysis and the
development of its own plan, that there are other reasonable alternatives for
preserving the salmon population. (R. at 15-16.)
The CTCR's plan becomes especially relevant when viewed in light of
the second of the Antoine sub-criteria: it must be necessary to regulate the
Indians. Courts have expounded on the meaning of 'necessary' inrelation
to non-treaty fishermen: "If alternative means and methods of . . .
conservation regulation are available, the state cannot lawfully restrict the
exercise of off-reservation treaty right fishing, even if the only alternatives
are restriction of fishing by non-treaty fishermen. . . ." U.S. v. Michigan,
505 F. Supp. 467, 475 (W.D. Mich. 1980) (quoting Washington, 384 F.
Supp. at 342).
The CTCR vigorously asserts that the Washington court's "alternative
means" rule regarding non-Indian fishermen should be extended to also
encompass non-Indians partaking in non-fishing activities near the Columbia
River. Such a holding would perfectly reconcile the conservation purpose
of the ESA with the government's deep-rooted trust responsibility to the
Indians.
B. The Conservation Purpose of the Plan Can Be Achieved by
Reasonable Regulation of All Non-Indian Activities.
Some support for extending the "alternative means" rule to all non-Indian
activities can be found in the Secretarial Order on Tribal Rights, Trust
Responsibilities and EndangeredSpecies ("Order") that was issued by the
Departments of Commerce and Interior on June 5, 1997. The Order
attempts to "harmonize" the federal trust responsibility to tribes and the
statutory missions of the Departments in implementing the ESA. Secretarial
Order § 1. With respect to habitat modifications which could result in
incidental takings, the Order adopts the "conservation standard," supra, and
adds another requirement for a sovereignty seeking to regulate treatyreserved rights: "... (ii) the conservation purpose of the restriction cannot
be achieved by reasonable regulation of non-Indian activities; ... "
Secretarial Order § 5, princ. 3(C).
This Court should adopt the abovementioned requirement in the context
of off-reservation treaty fishing, and should hold -that the NMFS must
initiate a plan that first seeks to achieve its conservation purpose through
the reasonable regulation of all non-Indian activities. As the CTCR's plan
and 'its Riparian Management Strategy illustrate, there are plenty of
'reasonable' regulations that exist that were not utilized by the NMFS in its
ESA-mandated Plan. (R. at 11, 16.) For example, greater restrictions than
those recommended by the NMFS could be placed on the industries
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surrounding the Columbia River basin; larger "buffer zones" could be
employed; and perhaps most significantly, the Snake River dams could be
removed. (R. at 11, 16.) These regulations would preserve the salmon,
while allowing the CTCR to continue to fish and maintain a moderate
standard of living. (R. at 13, 16.)
The Respondents will argue, and the CTCR concedes, that additional
regulations on all non-Indian activities will likely result in more cost to
those industries and to the government. However, additional cost does not
make these regulations unreasonable if compared to the alternative. Rather,
'unreasonable' would be taking away the CTCR's ability to fish, a practice
that the entire CTCR community relies on for its health and welfare.
'Unreasonable' would be preventing the CTCR from obtaining a moderate
standard of living. 'Unreasonable' would be causing the permanent decline
of a group of people that peacefully gave up much of its land in exchange
for the promise that it would be allowed to continue fishing. 'Unreasonable'
would be what the Government is trying to do in this case: go back on its
solemn word.
In light of the above, this Court should find that the NMFS must first
impose all reasonable restrictions on all non-Indian interests before
enforcing the ESA against the CTCR.
II. The Lower Court Erred in Holding that the CTCR Does Not Have a
Right to "Co-manage" National Forest System Lands in Order to Protect
Its Members' Ability to Exercise Their Treaty Fishing Rights to Maintain
a Moderate Standard of Living.
A. The CTCR Has the Right to Co-manage the NFS Lands Because the
Inherent Sovereignty of Indian Nations Implicates that the Governing of
Their Lands Without Their Co-managementIs a Breach of that Sovereignty.
A sovereign state is a state that possesses an independent existence,
being complete in itself, without being merely part of a larger whole to
whose government it is subject. Black's Law Dictionary, 1401 (7th ed.
1999). Sovereignty is the supreme political authority of an independent
state. Id. at 1402. "Indian tribes are unique aggregations possessing
attributes of sovereignty over both their members and their territory."
United States v. Mazurie, 419 U.S. 544, 557 (1975). The Indian tribes'
claim to sovereignty long predates the government of the United States.
McClanahanv. State Tax Comm'n, 411 U.S. 164, 172 (1973). Indian tribes
even retain inherent sovereign power to exercise some form of civil
jurisdiction over non-Indians on their reservations. Montana v. United
States, 450 U.S. 544, 565-66 (1981).
The CTCR is a sovereign body and must be respected accordingly. The
NMFS Plan simply does not respect the sovereignty of the CTCR. As the
record indicates, the NMFS consulted with the various other federal
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agencies with jurisdiction over the Columbia River basin to develop a
strategy for recovery of the listed stocks of salmon. (R. at 14.) At the same
time, NMFS began working with the states and private parties in the region
to develop a comprehensive plan aimed at saving and restoring Columbia
River salmon. Id. The participation of the CTCR, whose treaty-reserved
fishing rights were to be significantly affected by the Plan, was barely
encouraged. Id.
While the NMFS availed itself to suggestions of CTCR experts and
environmentalists, none of the CTCR-developed provisions were included
in the Plan. Id. In short, a plan that severely affected the CTCR's treatyreserved rights was developed and instituted by the government, and yet
evidence of consideration of these treaty-reserved rights is non-existent.
Thus, the sovereignty of the CTCR was clearly violated.
B. The United States Owes a Trust Obligation to the CTCR that Requires
It to Allow the CTCR to Co-manage the Lands So Its Member Tribes Can
Protect Their Best Interests.
Indian tribes are "domestic dependent nations" toward which the United
States has a trust obligation. See Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. 1,
17 (183 1). The tribal relationship to the United States "resembles that of a
ward to his guardian," Id. at 17. The United States "has charged itself with
the moral obligations of the highest responsibility and trust." Seminole
Nation v. United States, 316 U.S. 286, 296-297 (1942).
Decisions affecting a tribe must be discussed on a government-togovernment basis, ensuring that the resources on which the Tribes' treaty
rights depend will be protected. See Edmund J. Goodman, Protecting
Habitatfor Off-Reservation Tribal Hunting and FishingRights: Tribal CoManagement as a Reserved Right, 30 Envtl. L. 279, 337 (2000).
Consultation is a treaty-reserved right, as well as a component of the United
States' trust responsibility. Id. The USFS has both a "substantive" and a
"procedural" obligation to the CTCR to assure its members that they can
participate in matters affecting their treaty-guaranteed moderate standard of
living. Id.
The NMFS Plan's unilateral governing effect on the CTCR's treaty rights
represents a clear breach of the long-recognized trust responsibility the
government has toward the Indians. The CTCR has a right to participate in
the decision-making process that significantly impacts its lands and treaty
rights. "The era of paternalistic, unilateral decision-making by the federal
government is over, superseded by the more forward-looking policy of
encouraging the exercise of tribal sovereignty and tribal self-determination."
Edmund J. Goodman, The Indian TribalSovereignty and Water Resources:
Watersheds, Ecosystems and Tribal Co-Management,20 J. Land Resources
and Envtl. L. 185, 187 (2000).
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1. The CTCR Is a Capable Co-managingBody.
In United States v. Oregon, 699 F. Supp. 1456 (D.Or. 1988), affirmed,
913 F.2d 576 (9th Cir. 1990), a federal district court validated the Columbia
River Fish Management Plan that specified coordinated management and
resource planning of all involved bodies, including tribal expert groups.
Similar reasoning should be applied in this case: the inclusion in
management of all involved groups, including the CTCR, would be the best
way to address the concerns of all those potentially affected by the Plan.
The CTCR is an established and able managing body that must be
included in the specified coordinated management and resource planning for
the Columbia Basin in which its members reside. After all, the CTCR has
developed and currently maintains a Department of Natural Resources that
monitors the salmon resource and regulates tribal members' fishing rights.
(R. at 11.) Furthermore, the CTCR's Department of Natural Resources has
developed detailed management recommendations for the fishery resource.
(R. at 11-12.)
The CTCR's interdisciplinary environmental analysis of the NMFS Plan,
based on NMFS's own data, showed that with more stringent requirements
on each of the other affected industries, some tribal fishing could occur in
the short term without harming the resource. Id. In particular, the CTCR
analysis demonstrated that the breaching of four Snake River dams and
implementation of the CTCR Riparian Strategy would provide for sufficient
short and long-term recovery of salmon resources to permit levels of harvest
necessary to provide tribal members with a moderate standard of living. (R.
at 16.)
The CTCR's internal regulation of its own treaty-reserved fishing rights
and its ability to develop detailed conservation plans indicate that it is fully
capable of co-managing NFS lands. Based on this, and in light of the
abovementioned inherent sovereignty of Indian nations and the deep-rooted
trust responsibility of the federal government towards the Indians, this Court
should find that the CTCR has a right to co-manage the NFS lands at issue.
IV. The Lower Court Erred in Holding that the USFS Does Not Have an
Obligation to Manage Fisheries Habitat on NFS Lands to the Level
Necessary to Provide the CTCR Members with Sufficient Fish So That
They Can Exercise Their Treaty-Reserved Fishing Rights to Maintain a
Moderate Standard of Living.
The CTCR are entitled to harvest enough fish to sustain a "moderate
[standard of] living." PassengerFishing Vessel, 443 U.S. at 686. Therefore,
in light of this and the federal government's deep-rooted trust responsibility
to the Indians, this Court should find that even if the CTCR does not have
a right to co-manage the NFS lands at issue, the USFS at least has an
obligation to manage the fisheries to the level necessary to provide the
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CTCR members with sufficient fish so that they can exercise their treatyreserved fishing rights to maintain a moderate standard of living.
A. The United States v. Washington StandardRequiring Proof of Specific
Harms Necessitates Adjudication and Affirmatively Proves in This Case
the Absence of the Treaty-GuaranteedModerate Standard of Living.
In Washington, supra, the district court, referencing the Supreme Court's
decision in Passenger Fishing Vessel, supra, interpreted a treaty clause
enforcing treaty-reserved fishing rights on the Columbia River as having
"overriding importance" to the tribe at issue and that in order to ensure the
tribe a "moderate living" as guaranteed by the treaty, the state must protect
the fishery habitat to the necessary degree. 506 F. Supp. at 193. The
decision ensured the tribes a share of up to 50% of the off-reservation
salmon harvest, or whatever share up to 50% that is sufficient to provide the
tribes with a "moderate standard of living." Id.
The Washington decision was eventually vacated, but only because the
tribes had not alleged any specific harm in seeking broad declaratory relief.
506 F. Supp. at 193. The court decided that concrete facts must be set forth
prior to adjudication. Id. In the instant case, such facts are clearly present
and therefore the "moderate living" standard is undoubtedly applicable.
1. The CTCR's InterdisciplinaryEnvironmental Analysis of the NMFS
Plan'EstablishesSpecific Harm and DiscriminationSuffered by the
CTCR Which Eliminates Any Hope for a Moderate Standardof Living.
The record in the present matter is replete with examples of specific,
concrete harms, previously articulated by the CTCR, that would result if the
NMFS Plan is implemented. The CTCR previously notified the government
that the NMFS Plan places an unfair burden on tribal fishing, and that while
the riverside industries faced some prospect of loss, the CTCR faced a tenyear ban on the treaty fishing that is the heart of its sustenance. (R. at 15.)
The CTCR also previously asserted that their treaty rights require that the
NMFS impose more substantial restrictions on non-Indian use of the
affected resources before any limits could be placed on tribal treaty fishing.
Id. The CTCR further argued that, because of the location of its members'
usual and accustomed treaty fishing sites on the Snake River, it relies much
more heavily on Snake River fish than do the non-Indian fisheries in the
basin. Id.
As is stated above, the CTCR produced an interdisciplinary
environmental analysis of the NMFS Plan that showed that with more
stringent requirements on each of the other affected industries, some tribal
fishing could occur in the short term without harming the resource. (R. at
15-16.) In particular, the CTCR analysis demonstrated that the breaching
of four Snake River dams and implementation of the CTCR Riparian
Strategy would provide for sufficient short and long-term recovery of
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salmon resources to permit levels of harvest necessary to provide tribal
members with a moderate standard of living. Id. The NMFS' blatant lack
of consideration of these recommendations will cause serious harm to the
CTCR.
2. Uncontested Affidavits FurtherEstablish the Discriminationand the
Potentially Devastating Effects upon the CTCR That Would Result
from the Implementation of the NMFS Plan.
In an uncontested affidavit, Dr. Meiler concluded that the plentiful
salmon harvest was central to the political, economic, and cultural well
being of the CTCR. (R. at 13.) Any deviation from that level of harvest
could pose very harmful effects. Id. Specifically, Dr. Meiler summarized
the significant harmful effects as follows:
Salmon are the absolute bedrock of the CTCR community;
when fish are plentiful, the society thrives, and when they are
scarce, the entire community suffers. In my review of the entire
literature of socio-economic/ethnographic research, there is no
example of such a direct and powerful correlation between the
condition of a particular resource and the health and welfare of
an entire community as there is between the condition of the
salmon population and the health and welfare of the CTCR
community.
Meiler Aff., 1 28; R. at 13.
The Meiler affidavit concluded that the lower standard of living caused
by the smaller harvest yielded negative correlations to the health, welfare,
infant mortality, general mortality rates, income levels, employment rates,
and mental health of the tribes. (R. at 13.) The NMFS Plan is estimated to
result in monthly harvests of only ten pounds - ninety pounds less than the
estimated harvest necessary for the healthy survival of the CTCR
community. (R. at 12.)
To reiterate, without a harvest of at least 100 pounds of fish per month,
the aforementioned consequences would result and any hope for maintaining
the treaty-ensured moderate standard of living will be eliminated.
3. The Respondent Will Argue that the Effects of the NMFS Plan Are
Widespread and Balanced.
The Respondents will likely argue that the NMFS Plan spreads the
negative effects of the Plan appropriately and is a "reasonable" solution to
the issue at hand. However, the NMFS Plan clearly discriminates against
the CTCR. "While other industries faced some prospect of loss, the CTCR
faced a ten year ban on treaty fishing." (R. at 15.) (emphasis added). In
addition, after the ten-year ban that only partially affects industry, industry
"would be free from further enforcement actions by the NMFS." Id.
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Moreover, the Karr affidavit affirmatively concludes that the USFS
Riparian Strategy would provide for only "minimal protection" of salmon
spawning and rearing habitat. (R. at 12.) The affidavit states that such
minimal protections would only protect the habitat sufficiently enough to
maintain minimum viable populations of each of the listed salmon species.
Id. Dr. Karr specifically concluded the following:
Under the USFS Riparian Strategy, assuming that other
measures set out in the NMFS Plan were taken, there would
likely be sufficient fish to prevent extinction and provide for
minimal levels of harvest. However, the levels of harvest would
have to be restricted for a number of years, perhaps as many as
ten years. Even after the harvest moratorium were lifted, in the
long term this Strategy will only produce enough fish to permit
each tribal fisherman to harvest a maximum of 10 pounds of
fish per month.
Karr Aff., 1 30; R. at 17.
Under the NMFS Plan, the CTCR would never again be able to maintain
a moderate standard of living, and would therefore suffer immeasurably as
a tribal society. In short, the implementation of the NMFS Plan, while only
temporarily producing disadvantageous consequences for other Columbia
River constituents, would almost certainly result in the complete and
irreversible decimation of the CTCR community. Because of this, and in
light of the CTCR's treaty rights and the government's deep-rooted trust
responsibility to the Indians, this Court should find that the USFS has an
obligation to at least manage the fisheries at issue to the level necessary to
provide the CTCR members with sufficient salmon harvest so that they can
maintain a moderate standard of living.
Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, the Petitioner, Confederated Tribes of the
Columbia River, respectfully requests that this Court find in its favor.
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